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I find these admonitions just. LaCapra produces them, however, in defense of the (Western) historian's consideration of "great works." I suggest that "great works" of literature cannot easily flourish in the fracture or discontinuity which is covered over by an alien legal system masquerading as law as such, an alien ideology established as the only truth, and a set of human sciences busy establishing the "native" as self-consolidating other ("epistemic violence"). For the early part of the nineteenth century in India, the literary critic must turn to the archives of imperial governance as her text. As in many other cases, in other words, the introduction of the thematics of imperialism alters the radical arguments. "Often the dimensions of the document that make it a text of a certain sort with its own historicity and its relations to sociopolitical processes (for example, relations of power)," LaCapra writes, "are filtered out when it is used purely and simply as a quarry for facts in the reconstruction of the past."9 Even so modest a consideration of the construction of the object of imperialism as the present essay cannot be guilty of that error.
Perhaps my intent is to displace (not transcend) the mere reversal of the literary and the archival implicit in much of LaCapra's work. To me, literature and the archives seem complicit in that they are both a crosshatching of condensations, a traffic in telescoped symbols, that can only too easily be read as each other's repetition-with-a-displacement.
In a slightly different context, rethinking intellectual history, LaCapra proposes that the "relation between practices in the past and historical accounts of them" is "transferential"; and adds, "I use 'transference' in the modified psychoanalytic sense of a repetition-displacement of the past into the present as it necessarily bears on the future."
The transference-situation in analysis is one where the tug-of-war of desire is at work on both sides-on the part of both the analysand and the analyst. Both come to occupy the subject-position in the uneven progressive-regressive exchange. The task of the "construction" of a "history" devolves on both. To wish to replicate this in disciplinary historiography might simply mark the site of a radical version of the academic intellectual's desire for power. This desire can be located in the slippage between the suggestion that the relation between past practices and historical accounts is transferential, and, as LaCapra goes on to say in four paragraphs -the suggestion that, however difficult it might be-a "transferential relation" must be negotiated[] critically."10 In the first position, the historian uneasily occupies the couch. In the second, the logic of the analogy would make the historian share the responsibility of the analyst. The distance covered by the slippage between these two positions is precisely the metaphor of the "cure." Although I am generally sympathetic with LaCapra's use of the transference-model in disciplinary critique and the critique of the mentalitei-school of historiography, I cannot overlook the fact that to dissimulate the space of the "cure" disqualifies any methodological analogy 9. LaCapra, Rethinking, 31. 10. Ibid., 72-73. taken from transference. I have argued elsewhere, writing directly on psychoanalytic literary criticism, that this disqualification is perhaps irreducible.1 The psychoanalytic metaphor for transformative disciplinary practice in the human sciences will always remain a catachresis.
LaCapra is too sophisticated a thinker not to suspect this. In the place of this catachresis he offers us a "fiction": "It is a useful critical fiction to believe that the texts or phenomena to be interpreted may answer one back and even be convincing enough to lead one to change one's mind."12 If the "past" is an absolute "other," this "useful fiction" might track the mechanics of the construction of the self-consolidating other -a history that is in some sense a genealogy of the historian. What is marked is the site of a desire. I need not belabor the point.
Here too the situation of the post-colonial critic of imperialism undermines the argument. The point of this essay is to inspect soberly the absence of a text that can "answer one back" after the planned epistemic violence of the imperialist project.
In much the same way, the critique of imperialism must be differentiated from Fredric Jameson's current enterprise-without pretending, of course, to the extreme subtlety of his technique.
Of his own approach, Jameson writes: "It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity."13 We cannot privilege the narrative of history-as-imperialism as such an originary text, a "fundamental history." Our task is more circumscribed: first, to indicate that, even in varieties of radical critique, that narrative is reduced out; and second, to suggest that the narrative of history-as-imperialism should be at least irreducible. Otherwise the willed autobiographyy of the West masquerades as disinterested history, even when the critic presumes to touch its unconscious.14 I must confess that I have not been able to stop tinkering with bits of Freudian vocabulary. As far as I am able to understand my own practice, I do so 14. Hayden White has his version of an uninterrupted narrative whose fundamental history must be restored: it is the history of consciousness itself, "the deep [tropologically progressivist] structure of the historical imagination," "the single tradition of historical thinking." Everything proceeds here as if the sign "consciousness" has no history, no geopolitical specificity. (Metahistory, ix, x.)
In order to put together his theory of the "political unconscious" as the vast container of the uninterrupted narrative of fundamental history, Fredric Jameson also taps psychoanalysis. He constructs an adequate analogy between the Lacanian subject-model/discursive-orders of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real on the one hand, and the functioning of text and history on the other. It is Dominick LaCapra who has, in my view, successfully analyzed this problematic maneuver, suggesting that this is to misappropriate Lacan in rather a serious way (Rethinking, 245-251). in order to borrow an interpretative morphology and a powerful metaphorics, not to construct a collective sociopolitical Subject, nor yet to find an analogy for reading in the analytical situation. More about this later. The field of Third World criticism has become so quickly fraught that another methodological caution must here be advanced: In the United States the Third Worldism currently afloat in humanistic disciplines is often openly ethnicist or primitivist. I was born in India and received my primary, secondary, and tertiary education there, including two years of graduate work. My Indian example could thus be seen as a nostalgic investigation of the lost roots of my own identity. Yet even as I know that one cannot freely enter the thickets of "motivations," I would maintain that my chief project is to point out the positivist-idealist variety of such nostalgia entertained by academics in self-imposed exile. I turn to Indian material because, in the absence of advanced disciplinary training, that accident of birth and education has provided me with a sense of the historical canvas, a hold on some of the pertinent languages that are useful tools for a bricoleur-especially when she is armed with the Marxist skepticism of "concrete experience" as the final arbiter and with a critique of disciplinary formations. The Indian case cannot be taken as representative of all countries, nations, cultures, and the like that may be invoked as the Other of Europe as Self. This caution seems all the more necessary because, at the other end, studies of the English, French, and German eighteenth century are still repeatedly adduced as representative of the emergence of the ethical consensus -and studies of Emerson, Thoreau, and Henry Adams advanced as a study of the American mind.
II. THREE RANDOM EXAMPLES OF OTHERING
To set the stage for the Rani of Sirmur, let us consider three examples from the collections of "Proceedings" -dispatches, letters, consultations moving at the slow pace of horse, foot, ships laboriously rounding the Cape, and the quill pens of writers and copyists -surrounding the half-forgotten maneuvers of the "Settlement" of the many states of the Simla Hills in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. This is the Highland scrub country of the lower Himalayas between Punjab proper on the West, Nepal and Sikkim on the East, and what was to be named the North-West Provinces -today's Uttar Pradeshin the South. The country lies between the two great rivers Sutlej and Yamuna, and there are thus two valleys tucked in between the scrub, the Kaardah and the Dehra Valleys or Doons. The many kings of these Hills had lived out a heterogeneous and precarious equilibrium surrounded by the militarily and politically energetic Sikhs of the Punjab and Gurkahs of Nepal and by those relatively distant "paramount powers," the Mughal Emperor and the Pathan King of Delhi, the latter through his proxy the Nazim of Sirhind. It is a fantastic centuries-old scene of the constant dispersal of the space of power, with representations of representation operating successfully though not taking anyone in as the representation of truth -and above all, animated by no desire to compete with those four greater surrounding powers. When therefore, on August 2, 1815, David Ochterlony writes in secret consultation to the GovernorGeneral-in-Council: "The aggression of the Goorkahs compelled us to have recourse to arms in vindication of our insulted honour," most of the Hill-states were not, indeed could not be, The minimal context is as follows: The Governor-General was allowing halfpay subalterns to serve with regular troops in Native governments. The Court of Directors drafted a letter to reprimand him. I find this passage interesting because it makes brutally visible the policy that is more often noticed in the more general arenas of ideological production like education, religious conversion, or accessibility to common law.
If the project of Imperialism is violently to put together the episteme that will "mean" (for others) and "know" (for the self) the colonial subject as history's nearly-selved other, the example of these deletions indicate explicitly what is always implicit: that meaning/knowledge intersects power. The bold frankness of the passage comes through in the first reading. We must not forget that the Court of Directors at this time contained those very "saintly chairs," Charles Grant, Edward Parry, and others, whose obsession with the Christianizing of India is too well known to belabor. I am not so much concerned here with the policy of giving Christianity with one hand and ensuring military superiority with the other in this absolutely overt way, as with the strategy of the planned representation of master and native (an opposition with a different nuance from the more familiar master-servant). The master is the subject of science or knowledge. The science in question here is the "interested" science of war rather than "disinterested" knowledge as such. The manipulation of the pedagogy of this science is also in the "interest" of creating what will come to be perceived as a "natural" difference between the "master" and the "native"-a difference in human or racial material.
The Committee of Correspondence of the company let this bold passage pass. The Board of Control deleted it and simply ordered that the hiring out of subalterns be stopped. In the place of the deleted passages that I just read, they substituted the following: whatever may be your opinion upon the propriety of these orders, we desire that they may be implicitly obeyed: and we desire also that we may not again be placed in the painful alternative of either doing an act of apparent harshness or of acquiescing in an arrangement, not only made without our consent, but such as beforehand it must have been known that we should disapprove. desire and the law must coincide. The analogy is of course imperfect: our desire is your law if you govern in our name, even before that desire has been articulated as a law to be obeyed.
Continuing our
My three examples announce, in various modes, (a) the installment of the glimpsed stranger as the sovereign subject of information -the agent an instrument: Captain Geoffrey Birch; (b) the reinscription of right as being-obligedthe agent the stereotype of the imperialist villain: Major-General Sir David Ochterlony; (c) the divided master in the metropolis issuing desire proleptically as law: the agent anonymous because incorporated. All three are engaged in producing an "other" text-the "true" history of the native Hill States.
III. MORE ON FREUD; OR, FREUD AS MONITORY MODEL FOR THE CRITIC'S DESIRE
Of the three great European critics of ideology and rationality-Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud -Freud is the only one who worked within an institution, and indeed worked to shape an institutional science. The conflict between the critique of rationality and the work to institutionalize animates the detail of Freud's text. There we can find a monitory model for our own desire, to practice and produce an "interested" critique within academic disciplines. By contrast, merely to locate a diagnostic taxonomy in psychoanalysis or to counter it by another is to ignore the fact that Freud problematizes any statement of method that would begin, putatively, "I choose because.
In the classic chapters on the dream-work in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud develops the notion of "over-determination" as the principle of fabrication of the images in the dream-text. When one reads a dream-text one cannot hold to a simple theory of a text as expression, where the cause of the expression is the fully self-present deliberative consciousness of the subject. It can therefore be suggested that in extending the notion of "determination" Freud is working within the philosophical tendency that focuses on determination rather than causality. When we are attempting to deal with as heterogeneous a fabrication as the imperialist representation of the empire, the notion of determinate representations is much more useful than that of deliberate or deliberated) cause. It is in this spirit that I turn briefly to Freud's discourse here, not because I wish to compare the text produced by imperialism to a dream.24 Freud customarily speaks of the over-determination of images in a dreamtext as a telescoping of many determinations: mehrfach determiniert. In the section on "Means of Representation," however, Freud, still speaking of overdetermination, uses the phrase "anders determiniert" (determined otherwise). The quality of the images in the dream-text is determined otherwise "by two independent moments [Momente]." Is Freud using the philosophically charged word "Moment," rendered into the more colloquial "factor" in the Standard 24. If there is a denegated "wish" operating this statement, it would be trivially interpretable. Edition, with any precision? We cannot know.25 If we give Freud the stylist the benefit of the doubt, however, the two independent moments that determine the dream-text otherwise seem akin to different philosophical moments of appearance of consciousness. The first is our old friend "wish-fulfilment," where the psychic agency seems close to the deliberative consciousness that we colloquially identify as our "self." With respect to the second moment, Freud uses the word that covers for him when he wants to finesse the question of agency: "work." Let us note the hesitation and the economic metaphor in his language: "We shall not be altering the sense of this empirically based assertion if we put it in these terms: the greatest intensity is shown by those elements in a dream on whose imaging [Bildung] the fullest amount of condensation-work has been made use of [die ausgiebigste Verdichtungsarbeit in Anspruch genommen wurde]."26 Who knows if Freud is correct? All we notice is that he is marking the site of a desire similar to ours: the desire to hold in one thought something like a wish and an economy. In the text being read, a desire not to assign blame to some monolithic near-deliberative "British" or "colonial power," and yet not to pretend that to understand is to forgive. "We may expect," writes Freud, "that it will eventually turn out to be possible to express this condition [Bedingung] and the other (namely relation to the wish-fulfilment) in a single formula."27 He is not speaking of the type of image that constitutes the dream-text, but rather of the "transvaluation of all psychic value"28 in this otherwise-determination. What better concept-metaphor could one find for the transvaluing discursive shifts I have looked at in those little bits of archival material that I have quoted?
Using the Freudian concept-metaphor as a formal model, then, I am going to suggest that to disclose only the race-class-gender determinations of social practices is to see overdetermination as only many determinations. If we notice that explanations and discourses are irreducibly fractured by the epistemic violence of monopoly imperialism, we begin to entertain the possibility of a determination whose ground is itself a figuration: a "determination otherwise." Of course Freud never speaks of imperialism. But the notion of figuration at the ground surfaces in the pervasive Freudian discourse of Entstellung or displacement as grounding in the emergence of significance. Percival Spear, one of the standard historians of India, analyzes this ad hoc state-formation simply from the point of view of India's lack of nationhood. This is, once again, to assume the growth-pattern in Europe, more particularly Britain, as the unquestioned norm, considering the problems only in the domestic context, emphasizing the normativity in the colonial. Here what is one narrativization of history is seen not only "as it really was," but implicitly "as it ought to be." Spear therefore looks at the vigorous cartographic reinscription after 1813 as partly due to the fact that "a victory of an Indian leader was a victory for himself; a victory of an English general was a victory for England." From this it is not difficult to write unproblematically about the years 1813-1818: "The time was thus ripe for a new start in India."30 Here, in a "non-theoretical" context, a phrase as seemingly unproblematic as "new start" firmly covers over the contradiction between a mission to restore and a project to "world" a "world" that we have noticed earlier. My broader argument is that this contradiction is displaced into our own aporia between "tradition" and "development. , 1972) , 229, 235. Any extended consideration would "read" the "archives" in order to problematize common "factual" generalizations such as "exhaustion of the countryside," "general stagnation of life," and "social diseases" and raise the question of their overdetermined production, a strategy beyond the reach of the specializing undergraduate, the active unit of ideological production for whom such authoritative texts are written. The undoubtedly well-meant love and gratitude for "India" and "Indians" reflected in Spear's dedication consolidate its effectiveness. We have been arguing that "India" and "Indians," like all proper names, are "effects of the real," "representations," and should be read as such. Spear, dealing only in realities and facts, begins with a factual teleological narrative core, which he proceeds to expand in his book: "The purpose of this book is to portray the transformation of India under the impact of the West into a modern nation state" (Spear, India, 231-233, vii).
See for instance Christopher Hill, Economic History of Britain (New York, 1969), II, 216-220.
Court of Proprietors. The possession of ?500 stock entitled the holder to vote "in a show of hands"; possession of ?1,000 stock gave the Proprietor one vote in a ballot, ?3,000 two votes, ?6,000 three votes, and ?10,000 and upwards four votes, which was the maximum. A contemporary writer maliciously [and with a gratuitous bit of sexism at the end] described the General Court as "a popular senate; no distinction as to citizenship -the Englishman, the Frenchman, the American; no difference as to religion -the Jew, the Turk, the Pagan; no impediment as to sex -the old women of both sexes." lony in secret consultation writes to the Governor-General: "If there be a native government established it appears to his lordship that it ought to possess all the visible signs of sovereignty compatible with its feudal relation towards the British government, which may give it responsibility in the eyes of its subjects."34 An exquisite amalgam of the imagery of feudalism, mercantilism, and militarism, shadowily prefiguring the discourse of neocolonialism is to be found in a letter from John Adam to Ochterlony: You will remember that it was proposed to occupy the Kaardah Doon permanently for the Hon'bl Company. This possession besides its eventual importance in a military point of view might contribute to the general reimbursement of the expense which the British Government must necessarily incur.... and generally, to perform all the duties resulting from the feudatory relation in which they will stand towards us and to secure the free passage of our merchants and their goods through their respective territories, or else to define and enjoin all these duties and the corresponding obligations of protection and guarantee in a proclamation to be published throughout the territories under consideration. 35 We have commented upon the thematics of obligation and duty in the previous section. The publication of a proclamation authenticates the factual bases of these pseudo-ethical requirements. The facts are seen as based on feudal axiomatics.36 It is now possible to suggest that these mechanics of the constitution of "facts" are dissimulated in the official historical record -the book of factsrepresented in my text by Spear's India.
It is interesting to note that "Thackeray
The resort to feudal discourse can equally be supported by an inability or refusal to recognize the principle of commercial monopoly by territorial infringement when it was operated by the natives as a localized version of their so-called entitlement. Thus Geoffrey Birch to John Adam: I shall also beg leave to mention one species of oppression which I see no remedy for without putting government to some expense. Kalsee is the Mart for all the country lying between the Jumna and Tonse, and Merchandize is also frequently bought from Gurwal and Bussahir. As there is no place of shelter for the Traders to resort to, the Mahajens and Bunneahs of the town invite them to their houses, and I learn there is an understanding amongst them, that another shall not interfere with them in bidding for the merchandise in his house, consequently the trader is at his mercy as to the price, independent, of which he charges for the accommodation and for weighing or counting the goods.37 Ross's brief demographic analysis of the hills is that the people there are all "aboriginals of various kinds"; that the Sikhs, the Gurkhas, and the Moguls are varieties of "foreign yoke"; and that the rightful lords of the land are the Hindu chiefs about whose provenance or origin he is silent. This naive and phantasmatic race-differentiated historical demography is, curiously enough, identical in its broad outlines with the disciplinary Aryanist version of ancient India which Romila Thapar has so recently demystified.40 What is at stake is a "worlding," the reinscription of a cartography that must (re)present itself as Under the auspices of a race-divisive historiography, Robert Ross gives to each hill state an "original" undated outline, and then a second dated outline, generally marked with a seventeenth-or an eighteenth-century date. The project is to restore to each state the lineaments of this second origin. Yet, just as the argument for class-formation cannot be sufficient in this context, the argument from race-division will also be seen not to be so.
VI. GENDER
The project of the restoration of origin did not apply to Sirmur. As we approach Sirmur, we move from the discourses of class and race into gender -and we, are in the shadow of shadows. The Raja of Sirmur, Karma Prakash, was deposed by the British. The ostensible reason given was that he was barbaric and dissolute. Since the accusation of barbarism was brought in the secret correspondence against many of these chiefs, that does not seem sufficient grounds for removal from the throne. The only remaining reason, then, was that he had syphilis, which I take to be his "loathsome disease." The Rani is established as the immediate guardian of the minor king Fatteh Prakash, her son, because there are no trustworthy male relatives in the royal house. This, too, seems somewhat implausible, since Geoffrey Birch rides around with a man from the House of Sirmur, Duleep Singh by name, whose astuteness he elaborately This, then, is why the Rani surfaces briefly, as an individual, in the archives; because she is a king's wife and a weaker vessel. We are not sure of her name. She is once referred to as Rani Gulani and once as Gulari. In general she is referred to, properly, as the Ranee by the higher officers of the Company, and "this Ranny" by Geoffrey Birch and Robert Ross.
Since woman is not a genitalist category, and because the women of royal houses have a special place, I must once again quote a bit of colonial discourse from Edward Thompson's Suttee.
The Only two specific acts of hers are recorded. As soon as she is strictly separated from her deposed and banished husband, his other two wives, who had been parceled off to yet another place for fear of intrigue, ask to come back to her household and are received. Soon after, she remembers a great-aunt with whom her husband had long ago quarrelled and re-institutes a pension for her. She is astute, however, for she allocates Rs. 900, but promises Rs. 700 at first because she knows that Auntie will ask for more. These events are recorded because they cost money. "It has been necessary for Captain Birch," Ochterlony writes, "occasionally to interfere with her authoritatively to counteract the facility of the Ranee's disposition."49 We imagine her in her simple palace, separated from the authority of her no doubt patriarchal and dissolute husband, suddenly managed by a young white man in her own household. Such examples must be accommodated within the epistemic violence of the worlding of worlds that I have described above. For this too is the sudden appearance of an alien agent of "true" history in native space. There is no romance to be found here. I will suggest in a moment that, caught thus between patriarchy and imperialism, she is almost in an allegorical predicament.
And then the Rani suddenly declares her intention to be a Sati. One cannot accuse Geoffrey Birch of reporting on the Rani too leniently. Therefore it is particularly noticeable that he is obliged to use the language of affect when he does report this to the Resident in Delhi: quently concluded to allude to her intention of burning herself at his death, so I replied, she should now relinquish all thoughts of doing so, and devote herself to the love of her son and live for him. She said to the effect, that it was so decreed and she must not attend to advice deviating from it: so I conclude, she has resolved upon sacrificing herself.50
And now begins the tale of a singular manipulation of her private life. (I am aware of the problems with introducing a notion of "private life" into this context. Let us assume it as a name for whatever it is that is being maneuvered in the "separation of interests" between indigenous patriarchy and colonial government.) "I should consider a very grateful office, if Government may think proper to authorize my interference to prevent the Ranny fulfilling her intention. The best mode of effecting it would probably present itself on the occasion, but I should feel great satisfaction by being honored with any regulation from government for my conduct upon it."
In an earlier chapter of the book of which this is a part, I have analyzed the Brahminical discourse of widow sacrifice: beginning with moments from its socalled authority in the Rg-Veda, through the admonitory texts of the Dharma sastra, the legal sanctions of the sixteenth century and after; and concluded that it was a manipulation of female subject-formation by way of a constructed counter-narrative of woman's consciousness, thus woman's being, thus woman's being-good, thus the good woman's desire, thus woman's desire; so that, since Sati was not the invariable rule for widows, this sanctioned suicide could paradoxically become the signifier of woman as exception. On the other hand, I suggest that the British ignore the space of Sati as an ideological battleground, and construct the woman as an object of slaughter, the saving of which can mark the moment when not only a civil but a good society is born out of domestic chaos. Between patriarchal subject-formation and imperialist objectconstitution, it is the dubious place of the free will of the sexed subject as female that is successfully effaced. Here I append a brief summary of my argument:
For the female "subject," a sanctioned self-immolation within Hindu patriarchal discourse, even as it takes away the effect of "fall" attached to an unsanctioned suicide, brings praise for the act of choice on another register. By the inexorable ideological production of the sexed subject, such a death can be understood by the female subject as an exceptional signifier of her own desire, exceeding the general rule of a widow's conduct. The self-immolation of widows was not invariable ritual prescription. If however, the widow does decide thus to exceed the letter of ritual, to turn back is a transgression for which a particular type of penance is prescribed. When before the era of abolition, a petty British police officer was obliged to be present at each widow-sacrifice to ascertain its "legality," to be dissuaded by him after a decision was, by contrast, a mark of real free choice, a choice of freedom. Within the two contending ver- sions of freedom, the constitution of the female subject in life was thoroughly undermined.
These years were also the time when the British were assiduously checking out the legality of Satis by consulting pundits and priests. (In the event, when the law abolishing Sati was written, the discourse was once again the racedivisive one of the bestial Hindu versus the noble Hindu, the latter being represented as equally outraged by the practice as the British.)
For obvious reasons, the Rani was not susceptible to these general moves toward Sati. Saving her could not provide the topos of the founding of a good society. As we have argued, restoration of Aryan authority combined in contradiction with the proto-proletarianization of the aborigine had already filled that requirement. She could not be offered the choice to choose freedom. She was asked to live for her son; and she responded from within her patriarchal formation. She must not be allowed to perform even a "legal" sati, and, therefore, for her, pundits could not be consulted to produce the proper patriarchal legal sanction. In her case, the pundits must be coerced to produce expedient advice. Here discursive representation almost assumes the status of analysis, although, if one begins to wonder what "every means of influence and persuasion" might mean, that confidence begins to waver.
Here is the Governor's Secretary's letter to the Resident: And there the matter is dropped. The present provisional end of the story will be familiar to anyone who has researched in collections of records. Yet I do want to dwell on this all too familiar phenomenon to note the pattern of exclusions that makes the familiar function as such. As the historical record is made up, who is dropped out, when, and why? We remind ourselves of the meticulously tabulated cadets whose existence is considered "reasonable" enough for the production of the account of history. The Rani emerges only when she is needed in the space of imperial production.
I had kept some time in London to find out if the Rani did burn herself. I looked at a broader spread of the political and secret correspondence with India, at the Crown Representative Records, at the Residency Records, at a set of Privy Council Appeals and at Bengal Proceedings in general. The Rani is not in any of these things. In the era of abolition a Royal Sati would have been an embarrassment.
I intend to look a little further, of course. As the archivist assured me with archivistic glee: it will be a search. It seems appropriate that the trip to India will be made possible by two Conferences, on sexual difference and the construction of race respectively, in Britain and Australia. I will go to the National Archives. But I will go also to Sirmur.
In the decades after the "settlement" the violent re-territorialization of the Simla Hills gradually faded into the production of a summer retreat for the new civil service. That is how Simla is written into the mythography of colonial India. (Any extended study should consider this inscription in archeological terms, and with an eye to how early photography authoritatively established the "reality" of the new landscape.52) Two great-aunts of an American friend, her- I have never been to those hills. My own class provenance was not such as to allow summer vacations in so fashionable a resort area. This first trip will be an act of private piety. I want to touch the Rani's picture, some remote substance of her, if it can be unearthed. But the account of her representation is enough for the book. To retrieve her as information will be no disciplinary triumph. Caught in the cracks between the production of the archives and indigenous patriarchy, today distanced by the waves of hegemonic "feminism," there is no "real Rani" to be found.
But there is something else that works against disciplinary satisfaction in retrieving the Queen of Sirmur. I will invoke once again that prefiguration of the'current crises of capital caught between the nation and the globe. In its current figuration it traces out the international division of labor. The lives and deaths of the paradigmatic victims of that division, the women of the urban sub-proletariat and of unorganized peasant labor, are not going on record in the "humanist" academy even as we speak.54 VII. POSTSCRIPT Theoreticist purist friends in Britain and the United States have found in this paper too much concern with "historical realism," too little with "theory." I remain perplexed by this critique. I hope a second reading will persuade them that my concern has been with the fabrication of representations of historical reality.
At 
